Current situation in the field of development: This work is extremely topical in view of the need to maintain the existing PPS&MCA system of the Institute at the level which would meet all present-day requirements in this field and to ensure its high reliability and flexible operation.

The existing PPS&MCAS of the Joint Institute was installed in 1996 with assistance from the USA, Sweden and Japan under the auspices of the IAEA. Thanks to the technical assistance from the donor countries, the Institute received equipment and its specialists were invited to participate in workshops and training courses in MCA issues. At present the PPS covers the buildings where fissile nuclear materials are stored and used for research. Various types of sensors were installed along the perimeter and inside the buildings, allowing to define unauthorized entry into protected and vital areas. All the information from the sensors is transmitted to the Central Alarm Station (CAS). The entire PPS was designed according to The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, INFCIRC/225/Rev.2. The almost 8 year experience of operating the created PPS has proved its sufficiently high reliability. The installed systems, devices, equipment and sensors have proved to be highly jam resistant, secure and effective. In the course of the PPS operation there have been exposed several problems that call for immediate solution. Over this period some subsystems, devices and equipment have worn out, and supply of spare parts and system components has been exhausted. It is necessary to develop and carry out a DBT and work out measures for prevention of potential threats using contemporary approaches. The changing profile of the Institute’s laboratories, reflected in the creation of new test stands that are or will be using nuclear materials, calls for strengthening control over transfer of nuclear materials and ensuring their security. Along with that, the requirements to the systems security have become more stringent in view of the growing need to counteract international terrorism.

Being an integral part of the general system of ensuring nuclear materials security, MCAS also needs upgrades and modernization. The stand currently contains, under the IAEA safeguards, a large amount of nuclear materials of various configuration and physical and chemical properties. Over the past period MCA experts have performed a number of works on creating and maintaining the system in compliance with the guidelines laid down in the document of IAEA/SG/INF/2 "IAEA Safeguards: Guidelines for States' Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials" (1980) and requirements of the State Regulatory Body. The performed work included creation of a single material balance area; sorting nuclear materials into batches; organization of the tracking and reporting inventory system; creation of the computer-based nuclear materials database, and activation of equipment for performing non-destructive assay of nuclear materials.

Over the period of maintenance of the MCA system it has become necessary to upgrade the computer-based materials control and accounting system, to replace the obsolete components of the system for non-destructive assay of nuclear materials and to construct a certified nuclear materials measurement system. The need to upgrade the existing PPS&MCA system is confirmed by the results of the analysis, carried out by experts from Sandia and Pacific Northwest National Laboratories (USA) and laid down in the Vulnerability Assessment of the Joint Institute of Power and Nuclear Research-SOSNY / Belarus, conducted in 2003.

Impact on progress: Implementation of the project shall result in the development of a new concept of PPS&MCAS at the JIPNR-“Sosny”, meeting contemporary demands and international standards and seeking to 1 – raise the degree of protection of nuclear materials contained in the vaults and installations from unauthorized access with the purpose of nuclear weapons production and sabotage; and 2 – to provide for safe and controlled usage of nuclear materials for peaceful research purposes.

Project participants: Personnel of the JIPNR-“Sosny” who have experience in creation and maintenance of nuclear power plants and in the field of experimental nuclear physics. The project leader was among the designers of the current PPS&MCAS at the JIPNR-“Sosny”. All project participants have been involved in the creation and maintenance of the current PPS&MCAS at the JIPNR-“Sosny”.

Expected results:

Project category – Development and demonstration of technologies.

The project will include 7 tasks: 1- development of the plan for implementing the conceptual design of the PPS&MCAS upgrades at the JIPNR-“Sosny”, 2 – designation of technical objectives, which specify the conceptual design, 3 – doing a feasibility study, 4 – development of a draft concept for solving technical objectives, 5 – development of a final version of the concept of the design of the PPS&MCAS upgrades at the JIPNR-“Sosny”, 6 – upgrading the communications and alert system and 7 – creation of an emergency power supply system (UPS). The project will result in the development of a conceptual design for upgrading PPS&MCAS at the JIPNR-“Sosny”, which is to serve as a basis for upgrading the existing PPS&MCAS at the JIPNR-“Sosny” and the communications and alert system and creating an emergency power supply system (UPS).

Field of application: The conceptual design for upgrading PPS&MCAS is to be used for upgrading the existing PPS&MCAS of the JIPNR-“Sosny” as well as the communications and alert system and the emergency power supply system (UPS); the approach and methods used for developing the concept can be applied at other similar facilities in the NIS for creating PPS&MCAS.

The Project meets ISTC Goals and Objectives because:

1. It enables project participants, who earlier dealt with weapons development and production, to switch to peaceful activities through their participation in the work on improving security, storage, accounting, usage and control of nuclear materials seeking to reduce the risk of unauthorized proliferation of nuclear materials and technologies.

The foreign collaborators’ contribution will include: 1- providing methodological and information assistance during the design development, 2 – conducting expert analysis of the stages of the concept development and of the upgrades design on the whole, 3 – participating in discussion of suggested design solutions, 4 – providing advisory assistance in selecting contractors (subcontractors) for separate project stages, 5 – participating in consultations on selecting equipment suppliers, 6 – participating in tests of separate PPS components and the entire system, 7 – assisting with provision of funding for project participants to attend international meetings and training course in PPS and MCA issues, 8 – participating in technical inspection of the work on the project, 9 – assisting with organization of experience exchange trips to operational installations equipped with modern PPS.

Information on volume of works: The Project is to be implemented by a single organization – the Joint Institute of Power and Nuclear Research-“Sosny” (JIPNR-“Sosny”). Expected project duration: 9 months. Total project effort: 1,350 person-days. Number of tasks: 7.

This project envisages usage of modern methods and technological tools for creation of PPS&MCAS, which minimize the risk of unauthorized removal of nuclear materials or sabotage with regard to the peculiarities of a particular installation and minimizing the input of material and other resources, as well as the possibility of economic damage in the course of works.

The concept under development will take into account the on-going process of transition from the existing system to the newly developed one in order to preclude unauthorized access to or removal of nuclear materials and adhere to the principles of confidentiality when disclosing concrete circuit designs and layouts of circuits, sensors, equipment, barriers, service lines, communication systems, etc. It should be noted that some peculiarities of the facility, such as its broad scope of activities (both related and unrelated to nuclear materials), presence of commercial entities in the facility, a large territory surrounded by a forest and having a forest immediately in the protected area, as well as significant remoteness from the Fast Response Force base, make it necessary to deviate from classical approaches and methods of designing effective PPS.

The developers of the conceptual design for upgrading the MCAS will maintain its continuity with the currently existing system in operation. Suggested and reviewed upgrades will be considered for usage only if they are actually capable of enhancing reliability and operational characteristics of the system.