**Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Governance as a Foreign Policy Asset**

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**Introduction**

In the greater part of mainstream International Relations research, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) is mainly carried out based on neorealist assumptions or geopolitical explanations.Constructivism also manifests itself in the field,albeit more rarely**.** In the search for a possible constructivist analytical tool, Walter Carlsnaes suggested scrutinizing the *foreign policy act* as the building block of international relations. This method implies analyzing the preparatory intentional phase of the act, the identity pre-disposition of the actor, and the reaction of the structure (the international system) that reflects back onto the agency and influences it in turn.**[[1]](#footnote-1)**

In the same vein, Elisabetta Brighi and Christopher Hill argued that foreign policy decisions are best understood through the strategic-relational model.[[2]](#footnote-2) This model traces the loops that connect and blur together ends and means in foreign policy. It allows us to examine Kazakhstan’s foreign policy through surveying priorities and actions that mirror processes within the country. It overcomes the apparent black-and-white dilemma between interests-based and values-based policies, highlighting the in-betweens and the mixed results from foreign policy acts.

As far as the definition of national interests is concerned, Alexander Wendt, the father of constructivism, formulated a different viewpoint from that of neorealist theory. He expanded and qualified the assumption Kenneth Waltz made, that the only interest of states is survival.[[3]](#footnote-3) Instead, Wendt proved that national interests include the four objective interests of survival, autonomy / independence, economic well-being, and collective self-esteem.[[4]](#footnote-4)

In the existing literature, constructivist approaches have been applied to the analyses of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy primarily with regard to initiatives pertaining to “purely” external acts, with little attention paid to the interlink with internal or internalized norms and capacities. In terms of foreign policy promulgation, Kazakhstan’s nonproliferation initiatives are well known and recognized worldwide. It suffices to mention by way of evidence the initiatives leading to the UN Universal Declaration on Building a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, or the UNGA declaration of 29 August as the International Day against Nuclear Tests.

However, when it comes to Kazakhstan’s participation in scientific cooperation that can help improve international relations and ease tensions in situations of political strain, the record is less clear. In terms of development cooperation, the transfer of Kazakh experience in the governance of the nuclear sector is a lesser-known asset.

The experience of the Committee for Atomic and Energy Supervision and Control and of KAZATOMPROM in uranium mining and transport was shared with countries from the Southern African Development Community (SADC), under an EU-funded project, implemented by the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), namely Project MC 5.01 15B *Support to Southern African States in Nuclear Safety and Security.*[[5]](#footnote-5)This example reveals the considerable potential that nuclear governance has to substantiate the input of Kazakhstan in international development cooperation in general, and in the improvement of the security–development nexus within it.

Given its considerable economic and demographic potential, Kazakhstan is turning into an emerging middle size power that seeks to become a significant factor in international relations. Kazakhstan’s ambitions on the international arena do not solely stem from its ideational aspirations to be a ‘good’ member of global society and increase its favorable image in the world, but also from an attempt to contribute to the establishment and codification of standards for international behavior. There exists a plethora of pragmatic reasons underpinning specific foreign policy decisions as well, related to the need for external investment and technological innovations. Besides, it provides an interesting perspective on the performance by Kazakhstan as an emerging donor of official development aid.

Kazakhstan constitutes a typical example of an emerging regional power. Kazakhstan’s non-proliferation policy can help define the impact of this type of actors on the international system. The question is whether they tend to be drivers for change towards multi-polarity or could equally be a stabilizing factor due to their preference for more normative elements in the IR anarchical environment. Moreover, the study of the Kazakhstan case proves that the natural inclination of middle-size actors in favour of enhanced regionalism does not preclude, but rather complements their evolution towards becoming pillars of international community.

Seen from this angle, it would be worthy to analyze aspects of the nuclear governance potential Kazakhstan disposes with and how it may support its regional policies and the intra-regional cooperation, in particular between Africa and Central Asia.

**Accumulated Normative Experience and Expertise**

In Kazakhstan the contemporary regulatory framework for atomic energy use and radiation safety came into existence in a specific historical context related to the break-up of the Soviet Union. Additional specificity arises from the characteristics of the state political system, particularly the preeminent role and function of the presidency. One observation Thomas Wright, a Brookings-based scholar, made about U.S. foreign policy may equally apply to Kazakhstan, namely that it is ‘*defined by the character and the opinions of its president’*, not anybody else. [[6]](#footnote-6)

The regulatory framework of Kazakhstan has four tiers: (1) Decrees by the President, promulgating Laws adopted by Parliament**;** (2) Decisions (Decrees) of the Council of Ministers; (3) Rules and Regulations defining radiation safety issues, prescribing permissible levels of radionuclides in the environment, etc., approved by the relevant empowered State Agencies; (4) Standards, Guidelines, and Standard Operational Procedures, adopted by industry and other actors.

The relevant pieces of legislation include: Law No. 442-V «*On the use of atomic energy*» dated 12 January 2016;**[[7]](#footnote-7)** Law No. 219 «*On radiation safety of the population*» dated 23 April 1998;[[8]](#footnote-8) Law No. 202-V «*On permits and notifications*» dated 16 May 2014;[[9]](#footnote-9) which replaced the Law "On licensing»; the *Environmental Code* of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 212 dated 9 January 2007.[[10]](#footnote-10)

The legal basis in Kazakhstan reflects and responds to national circumstances. It provides a lore of codified experience on topics related to nuclear and radiation safety and security; nuclear science, technology and applications; efficiency of the IAEA safeguards, verification and non-proliferation; and also encompasses a range of topics from licensing through export control and public awareness to training and certification of personnel employed at nuclear power facilities.

The African context differs considerably from the conditions and inherited legacies in Kazakhstan. However, many African countries seek to develop or improve regulatory frameworks and policies in their pursuit of uranium production, nuclear energy and other nuclear applications. Some Kazakh regulations of peaceful use of atomic energy provide an adequate example for benchmarks for them to follow.

For instance, in Kazakhstan the Law «*On the use of atomic energy*» defines the basic rights of authorized state bodies and officials. The Committee for Atomic and Energy Supervision and Control (CAESC), the nuclear regulator, is a department of the Ministry of Energy. In South Africa the situation is similar. In most of the Southern African countries, however, the regulator is placed under the Ministry of Health as is the case in Kenya and in Zambia, or the Ministry of Environment - as in Malawi and in Eswatini. In the Seychelles, on the other hand, the regulator is located in the Ministry of Labor and Employment, to be institutionally equally distanced from proponents and critics of atomic energy use.

CAESC provides an example of an independent and autonomous regulatory organ, regardless of its position in the specific institutional organizational chart. It also illustrates that the regulator should possess the necessary organizational, financial, material and technical resources and should have qualified personnel for the safe operation and maintenance of a nuclear installation throughout its entire life cycle.

In Kazakhstan the Law «*On radiation safety of the population*» establishes radiation safety standards, sanitary rules, hygienic standards, building codes and rules, labor protection rules, methodological, instructional, and other documents on radiation safety. In turn, the Law «*On permissions and notifications*» regulates the introduction and implementation of a permit or notification procedure for the implementation of certain types of activities. It is noteworthy that the legislative framework of the nuclear industry in Kazakhstan continues to develop dynamically. For instance, on 30 April 2020 the Senate adopted a draft bill on civil liability which domesticates the 1997 Vienna Convention, ratified by Kazakhstan, and protects potential victims of damage resulting from a nuclear incident. African countries similarly experience the dynamics of emerging nuclear governance.

Another exampleisthe *Environmental Code*, which incorporates international experience in ensuring environmental safety and production in Kazakhstan. It pays special attention to the transboundary movement of radioactive waste and materials, to the radiation situation in settlements, to the radiation safety of building materials, mineral fertilizers, fuel, and energy raw materials. In Africa, among the SADC Member States, there is an acute need to ensure safe and secure transportation of nuclear material within and out of the region.

In addition to the level of statuary legislative acts, Kazakhstan has developed various normative and technical regulations, such as: technical regulations on nuclear and radiation safety,[[11]](#footnote-11) on the safety of nuclear power plants,[[12]](#footnote-12) and on nuclear research installations;[[13]](#footnote-13) as well as sanitary standards and epidemiological requirements for ensuring radiation safety,[[14]](#footnote-14) and associated rules[[15]](#footnote-15) and rules for radiation-hazardous objects.[[16]](#footnote-16) The secondary legislation also includes: rules on the collection, storage, and disposal of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel;[[17]](#footnote-17) on advanced training of personnel employed at nuclear power facilities;[[18]](#footnote-18) on the certification of personnel;[[19]](#footnote-19) and on qualification requirements for personnel employed at nuclear power facilities.[[20]](#footnote-20)

The above mentioned vast and expanding database of relevant documentation served as source of orientation and guidance during the implementation of the project *Support to Southern African States in Nuclear Safety and Security*. Under the supervision of a team of Kazakh experts led by Dr. Timur Zhantikin, Director of NPP, African participants prepared nine country specific reports on Eswatini, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, respectively, thus covering more than half of the SADC Member States. In all these case studies, with the exception of the report on South Africa, the legislative framework on nuclear governance is in an emerging state, and the Kazakh experience was welcomed as a valuable model and example for various normative documents.

According to the Embassy of Kazakhstan in Pretoria, accredited to all countries south of the Sahel, the nuclear safety cooperation with African counterparts gave substance to the bilateral relations with some states, with which Kazakhstan has an otherwise insignificant trade exchange, or practically no collaboration at all. Science and technical cooperation boosted the entire complex of bilateral relations, raising the international esteem and trust towards Kazakhstan in individual countries and in the region. The episode therefore illustrates how an act of international cooperation, for which Kazakhstan has due pre-disposition, brings back a positive reaction from the system, and helps achieve part of the foreign policy objectives, at least as perceived from constructivist point of view.

**Domestication of International Treaties and Conventions on Nuclear Safety and Security**

In terms of the existing UN treaties relevant to nuclear safety and security, the attention of Kazakhstan was focused on the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the cornerstone of the global nuclear order. Among the international commentators of NPT, Kazakhstani experts included, there is a broadly shared understanding that this order faces three possible options: [[21]](#footnote-21) preservation of “*the same number of the nuclear states and nuclear weapons [ in the hope ] that nuclear weapons are not used by states or terrorists*“; a process whereby “*new states acquire nuclear weapons….or existing states abandon arms control and revert to Cold War postures*”, or “*infused with a new collective sense of common danger and responsibility, it [the order] could transition to ”zero”, a world with few or no nuclear weapons*”. The latter option, constructivist in nature, is the guideline for Kazakhstan. In practice the first and the second option seem to be unfolding simultaneously in recent years.

Within the NPT-specific topics, Kazakh diplomacy has developed a sensitivity towards the so-called “Article X problem”, through which states could avail themselves of the right to peaceful use in order to develop secretly nuclear military applications, and then retreat from NPT with impunity (as done by the DPRK). Hence the proposal of Kazakhstan to make withdrawal from the NPT extremely difficult and costly, potentially through a special Security Council resolution that would have serious consequences for Treaty violators.[[22]](#footnote-22)

Kazakhstan’s participation in the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Nuclear Disarmament Verification[[23]](#footnote-23) illustrates motivating aspects of the country’s attitude towards the NPT implementation, and also some similarities with the approach of South Africa, standing in GGE for the African group. The Kazakh representative at GGE, Dr Erlan Batyrbekov, Director General of the National Nuclear Center, made various valuable contributions, including the proposal for involvement of the scientific community in the verification process. His supporting arguments referred to the social factors of nuclear disarmament, and the need to increase public trust in the monitoring process.[[24]](#footnote-24)

Kazakhstan signed and ratified practically all international conventions related to nuclear safety and security, introduced into the national legislation by the following laws: Law No. 243-IV «*On ratification of the Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident*», dated 3 February 2010;[[25]](#footnote-25) Law No. 244-IV «*On ratification of the Convention on assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency*», dated 3 February 2010;[[26]](#footnote-26) Law No. 416-IV «*On ratification of the amendment to the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material*» (A/CPPNM), dated 19 March 2011;[[27]](#footnote-27) Law No. 245-IV «*On ratification of the Convention on nuclear safety*», dated 3 February 2010;[[28]](#footnote-28) Law No. 405-IV «On ratification of the Vienna Convention on civil liability for nuclear damage of 1997», dated 10 February 2011;[[29]](#footnote-29) Law No. 246-IV «*On ratification of the joint Convention on the safety of spent fuel management and the safety of radioactive waste management*», dated 3 February 2010; [[30]](#footnote-30) and Law No. 92-II «*On ratification of the Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters*» dated 23 October 2000.[[31]](#footnote-31) Out of these conventions A/CPPNM has particular importance universally, including for African states, being the only legally binding international instrument.

**Acquired Institutional Framework**

In Kazakhstan, apart from CAESC, several other government bodies have regulatory functions in the nuclear field: the Committee of Environmental Regulation and Control of the Ministry of Ecology, Geology, and Natural Resources;[[32]](#footnote-32) Committee of Sanitary and Epidemiological Control of the Ministry of Healthcare; national security services of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (on security matters), Committee of Industrial Safety of the Ministry for Emergency Situations (on elimination of consequences of accidents); Industrial Development and Industrial Safety Committee and Transport Committee of the Ministry of Industry and Infrastructural Development.

Being at the heart of the regulatory system, CAESC has diverse competences in the conduct of national policies and international cooperation in the nuclear field, supervision and licensing of activities, elaboration of technical regulations, physical protection, accountancy and transport of nuclear materials, radiation sources and waste, rules for advanced training and certification of personnel, export control, etc.

Alongside with the attribution of functional competences, the Kazakh system provides good example for others to follow in the coordination and synchronization of the performance of various government agencies involved in nuclear control and supervision. The resolution of the Government No. 769 «*On the organization of state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material and ionizing radiation sources*», dated 22 July 2005, provides the normative framework for such coordination.

In terms of export control, Kazakhstan accepts and implements national procedures and rules that are in line with the international norms and practices. The country is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (since 2002), the Zangger Committee (since 2008), as well as a candidate for accession to the Wassenaar Agreement, with strong credentials. It applies the EU List of Export Control on Dual-use Material and Technologies. To promote the latest achievements of the export control system in industrial enterprises, Kazakh Internal Control Programs are elaborated and adopted, serving also as guidelines and teaching material.[[33]](#footnote-33)

**The Intermediary Frameworks for Knowledge Transfer and Experience Sharing**

Kazakhstan disposes with various mechanisms through which it can make its expertise in nuclear governance internationally known. The International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), headquartered in Nur-Sultan, is one of them. The Center has executed numerous projects, including in institution building, training, education and scientific research. Since 1995, ISTC has funded 67 projects of the National Nuclear Center worth a total of $25 million, based on project agreements and individual experts’ assignments, approved by the government of Kazakhstan. Since 2016, ISTC has expanded the scope of its activities to cover African countries, and implements nuclear safety projects on the continent, making use of the available Kazakh expertise.

Kazakhstan disposes with state of the art internationally renowned technical support organization, the Nuclear Technology Safety Center (NTSC). It supports CAESC in relevant areas, such as: modelling and risk assessment, waste disposal, reactor engineering and NPP, nuclear safety and safeguarding, radioactive materials handling, internal compliance program for industry producing dual use materials and technologies. The Center cooperates with international partners in the field of nuclear and fusion energy, reactor physics and radiation material science, radioecology, new conversion and nuclear technologies, nonproliferation, including information and personnel exchange.

Under the EU-funded ISTC-implemented Project *Support to Southern African States in Nuclear Safety and Safeguards*, NTSC prepared working visit for representatives of sixteen African countries with the purpose of acquainting them with the experience of Kazakhstan in ensuring safety in the process of mining, milling and transport of uranium ores. An overview of the program provides a wide picture of the multifarious knowledge and practical experience Kazakhstan may offer to international counterparts. In Nur-Sultan the working visit comprised meetings at CAESC - on nuclear sector regulation and governance, and at the Nuclear Society of Kazakhstan - on awareness raising and demystifying of nuclear.

In Stepnogorsk, the *Kazatomprom* Joint Venture Sulfuric Acid Plant stood ready to share achievements in the “yellow cake” uranium production cycle, the underground leaching method, the safe and efficient transportation of uranium oxide, etc.

In Oskemen, the Ulba Metallurgical Plant would show its industrial safety and security system, and the unique IAEA Bank of Low Enriched Uranium, guaranteeing access to nuclear fuel for states that have renounced weapons-grade uranium enrichment.

In Taukent, the working visit would take participants to the Taukent Mining and Chemical Enterprise to witness safety measures in uranium mining.

In Almaty, they would visit various installations at the Institute of Nuclear Physics: a WWR-K research nuclear reactor, a U-150M isochronous cyclotron, a UKP-2-1 electrostatic accelerator, and an ELV-4 industrial electron accelerator. In turn, the Almaty Institute of Oncology and Radiology would demonstrate to the visitors safety and security systems at facilities using category 1 and 2 radioactive sources.

The Nuclear Society of Kazakhstan (NSK), the consolidated organizations of nuclear science and industry in Kazakhstan, was designed to enhance public awareness in the field of use of peaceful nuclear power and various nuclear applications, and it has fulfilled its mission very successfully thus far. In the context of contacts with African counterparts, during the 2017 EXPO, it hosted a visit of officials from eleven African countries that were impressed by the NSK activities geared towards the younger generations, and, in particular, by the Information Center «Energy of the Future». The objectives of the Center are very pertinent for many African countries that seek to enhance their science and technical education, improve the dissemination of basic knowledge about the nuclear industry, and ensure the transfer of knowledge and experience among communities of practitioners. Moreover, the NSK Youth section established contacts with the African Young Generation in Nuclear, a non-profit organization committed to ensuring the youth engagement and support within the nuclear industry.

As mentioned above, Kazakhstan established a low-enriched uranium bank under the auspices of the IAEA in Ust-Kamenogorsk to be used for peaceful purposes in the event of a disruption in the supply of fuel for nuclear power plants. This unique storage facility is of interest to potential buyers of nuclear fuel.

Another major facility is the Nuclear Security Training Center, under the Institute of Nuclear Physics, a first-class training facility with programs in physical protection, accounting and control, reduction of illegal traffic of nuclear materials, radiation safety and radiation control, and information security. The Center is a leading member of the IAEA International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support.

At the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Astana, the Accelerator Complex DC-60 is also a convenient site for radiological security trainings. In 2017, it hosted the Regional Radiological Emergency Response Exercise “SUNKAR” to which several East and Central Africa (ECA) countries—Kenya, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania, the Seychelles, Uganda and Zambia—sent observers. The exercise consisted of two parts: a hybrid Table-Top Exercise (TTX) that included simulation, on a compressed time scale, of a radiological incident with radioactive source and, going beyond a traditional TTX, Practical Demonstration of emergency response radiation measuring and identification techniques and on-site emergency response actions.

Another training site in Kazakhstan of interest to African counterparts is the Anti-Crisis Training Center in Ust-Kamenogorsk, a state-of-the-art facility equipped with shooting and automobile training systems, and transport simulators. The Center was set up under the joint Global Nuclear Security Program.

The Center for Emergency Situations and Disaster Risk Reduction (CESDRR) for Central Asia is additional institutional sediment from international cooperation in the region. The Center is a permanent intergovernmental body, an international organization established to ensure effective mechanisms to decrease the risk of emergencies, to mitigate the consequences, to organize a joint response through agreed measures of the Parties and to stimulate regional and international cooperation. African countries face similar challenge to interact in disaster risk reduction, prevention and elimination of emergency situations. They may benefit from the experience of Central Asian states to coordinate mutual efforts and strengthen preparedness for effective and timely response to emergencies, including the spread of dangerous radiation.

**Regional Approaches**

Like other emerging regional powers, Kazakhstan has a natural inclination in favor of enhanced regionalism. This does not preclude, but rather complements its aspirations after an intermediary place, in-between the great powers and the small states on the international arena. Moreover, emerging regional powers show a tendency to link various adjacent regions of the world and contribute to the formation of a comprehensive international system. Some facets of Kazakhstan’s non-proliferation policy acts follow such trajectory.

In Central Asia, integrational tendencies have appeared periodically on the regional arena, mainly due to external incentives and pressure. Kazakhstan worked consistently to construe the Central Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (CANWFZ), thus introducing a new dimension to the regional cooperation. However, nuclear security and safety remain relatively low on the scale of shared priorities. Multilateral regional projects in that field are mostly proposed and funded by external actors. An example in that regard is the EU-sponsored Strategic Master Plan for Environmental Remediation of Uranium Legacy Sites in Central Asia.

In a sense, Kazakhstan uses the regional platform as a springboard to increase its involvement in the United Nations, as illustrated by its non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council in 2017 - 2018. The country ran for the Security Council seat as the first ever candidate from Central Asia, building on its positive record in disarmament and non-proliferation and opposition to arms race. The latter achievements can hardly be attributed to Central Asia as a whole. They belong to Kazakhstan itself.

Throughout Kazakhstan’s campaign at the United Nations, nuclear security was a major topic among the four central pillars on which the bid was based. The main priorities of Kazakhstan’s membership in the Security Council were laid down in special policy address to the Security Council, entitled “*Concept and vision for sustaining global partnerships for a secure, just and prosperous world*”.[[34]](#footnote-34) Kazakhstan’s prime goal was to help ensure humankind’s survival through a world free of nuclear weapons. Kazakhstan called on all Member States, especially the Security Council’s permanent members, to set a goal of ridding the world of nuclear weapons by the one hundredth anniversary of the United Nations in 2045.

Nealy all elected members at the Security Council, Kazakhstan included, feel they should mark their presidencies of the Council with thematic debates to fulfil campaign commitments and to provide platforms for their leaders. In January 2018, Kazakhstan opted for the theme of “*Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: confidence-building measures*”, two topics that form the core of the country’s legacy and interests. Conflict management and resolution also came under scrutiny indirectly, in the sense that these processes urgently need confidence and trust as a pre-requisite for success.

Meanwhile, Kazakhstan participated actively in the elaboration and adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which became the first legally binding document in the history of nuclear disarmament and signed it on 2 March 2018, the day of the anniversary of its accession to the United Nations.

In terms of regional non-proliferation policy, following the entry into force of CANFWZ on 21 March 2009, Kazakhstan needs to create a permanent mechanism to the Treaty of Semipalatinsk in the form of a Regional Consultative Process (RCP). The Semipalatinsk RCP is to be understood as one of the methods of governance in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation on a regional scale. A future Secretariat of the Semipalatinsk RCP will boost the capacity of CANWFZ to interact with other nuclear weapons free zones, Africa included, where the African Commission on Nuclear Energy performs similar functions.

**Global and Inter–regional Dimensions**

The overall state of the international system provides the context of the foreign policy behavior of individual states, including Kazakhstan. While scholarly opinions on the evolution of the IR system differ, at times dramatically, it would be fair to say that the system demonstrates a considerable degree of resilience. Academic explanations of the resilience of the international system include the observation that the United States successfully steers its foreign policy course from dominance to leadership. Jake Sullivan from the Carnegie Endowment believes that “*over the past decade, the U.S. diplomacy has facilitated a shift from formal, legal, top-down institutions to more practical, functional, and regional approaches to managing transnational issues – through “coalitions of the willing” … This shift…has also made the rule-based order less rigid, and therefore more lasting.*”[[35]](#footnote-35)

A noteworthy example is the process of Nuclear Security Summits that the US initiated to draw attention, at the highest possible level, to the need to secure nuclear material and thus prevent nuclear terrorism. Forty-seven countries and three international organizations participated in the first summit. Kazakhstan was among the most active and enthusiastic participants.

Kazakhstan also participates in the Global Partnership (GP) Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The country is actively engaged in preparation of the gift basket initiatives. A telling example is the Japanese initiative for a Transport Security Gift Basket. The latter is realized through four working groups chaired, respectively, by Japan (for road transport), the UK (for maritime transport), Kazakhstan (for railway transport), and the US (for air transport). Gift basket diplomacy fundamentally is a collective action agreed by smaller groups of participants that goes beyond the lowest common denominator consensus that larger groups often reach in large multilateral fora. In the framework of the NSS and the Global Partnership, Kazakhstan demonstrates that is capable of contribution to the development of the normative base of the international system and the spread of best practices in its implementation.

Another example of leading position of Kazakhstan is pertinent in the field of verification. Since 2019, the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) has been undertaking a project, with funding from the Norwegian government, in support of the development and strengthening of practical and effective nuclear disarmament verification measures for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons. The project aims to analyze the potential involvement of Argentina, Brazil, Kazakhstan and South Africa in nuclear disarmament verification activities.

The project investigates the feasibility of establishing national or regional nodes/hubs for nuclear disarmament verification in the Global South. It also seeks to initiate the identification of possible lessons that may be applicable for future nuclear disarmament initiatives from the experiences of the South African case of terminating and dismantling its nuclear explosive device program in a verifiable and irreversible manner; of Kazakhstan, in the decommissioning of nuclear test site infrastructure; and of Argentina and Brazil, in the verifiable disposal of weapons-usable fissile material. The perception is that the national or regional nodes/hubs—in Africa, Central Asia and Latin America—could constructively engage with each other and share their work to develop a cadre of verification experts and appropriate approaches, policies and programmes.

While disarmament is primarily a political matter, verification is a technical matter. Verification challenges are a mix of political and technical aspects. Nuclear disarmament verification research and innovation should also be at both the technical and conceptual levels, influenced by both technical and political considerations. Kazakhstan is therefore very well positioned to prove in action both its political will and technical expertise.

**Conclusion**

Kazakhstan, the country that voluntarily renounced the world's fourth largest nuclear arsenal, strives to remain a reliable partner of the international community in matters of non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The example set up by Kazakhstan provides support and inspiration to various countries, African states included, regardless of their political, economic, and military potential, to address issues related to the renunciation of nuclear weapons and the peaceful use of atomic energy.

The implementation of Kazakhstan's policy in the field of non-proliferation, export control, use and control of nuclear technologies within the framework of international cooperation helps Kazakhstan to create an effective and efficient nuclear security infrastructure and, as a result, increase the effectiveness of the non-proliferation and export control regime in the world.

As an emerging regional middle power, the country has the vocation and capacity to act towards strengthening regionalism, but also towards dialogue and cooperation between different regional and sub-regional associations. Kazakhstan, the country in the heart of Eurasia with impressive initiatives in global non-proliferation, exults *intra muros* of the UN and other relevant formats not only its own voice, but that of an entire category of international actors—the emerging middle powers.

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3. Waltz, Kenneth, *Theory of International Politics*, First Edition. Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1979 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics, First Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University

   Press, 1999, 235-237 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. [www.sadcproject.istc.int](http://www.sadcproject.istc.int) [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Wright Thomas J., All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the Twenty-First Century and the Future of American Power (2017) Yale University Press; p XIII. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. http://adilet.zan.kz/eng/docs/Z1600000442 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. http://adilet.zan.kz/eng/docs/Z980000219 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
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18. <http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/V1600013456> [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. <http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/V1600013468> [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. <http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/V1600013466> [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Anthony Burk, *Uranium* (2017), Polity Press; p.145 [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Policy address to the Security Council by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, entitled “Kazakhstan’s concept and vision for sustaining global partnerships for a secure, just and prosperous world” on the occasion of the start of Kazakhstan’s non-permanent membership of the Security Council for 2017-2018 , S/2017/19. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. A/RES/71/67 Nuclear disarmament verification. *The GGE consisted of representatives from the following countries: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA* [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Project paper: *Kazakhstan as a member of the Group of Governmental Experts: how the country can best contribute to make this UN process successful?* [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. <http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/Z100000243> [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. <http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/Z100000244> [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. <http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/Z1100000416> [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. <http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/Z100000245> [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. <http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/Z1100000405> [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. <http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/Z100000246> [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. <http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/Z000000092> [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. <http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/G1900000005> [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. <http://www.nuclear.kz/journal/vypusk-3-51-2019.html?lang=ru> [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Policy address to the Security Council by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, entitled “Kazakhstan’s concept and vision for sustaining global partnerships for a secure, just and prosperous world” on the occasion of the start of Kazakhstan’s non-permanent membership of the Security Council for 2017-2018, S/2017/19. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Jake Sullivan, The World After Trump: How the System Can Endure? in Foreign Affairs, Volume 97, Number 2, March/April 2018, pp 10-20. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)